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| Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
|---|---|---|
| dc.provenance | Universidad de San Andrés | - |
| dc.creator | Arozamena, Leandro | - |
| dc.creator | Shunda, Nicholas | - |
| dc.creator | Weinschelbaum, Federico | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-04T16:53:02Z | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-15T13:15:01Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-05-04T16:53:02Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-05-15T13:15:01Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2012-03 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://10.0.0.11:8080/jspui/handle/bnmm/56051 | - |
| dc.description | In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller ´s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We find the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value, single-unit model under favoritism. At the optimal auction there is a reserve price, or an entry fee, which is decreasing in the proportion of preferred bidders and in the intensity of the preference. Otherwise, the highest-valuation bidder wins. We show that, at least under some conditions, imposing a no-discrimination constraint raises expected seller revenue. | - |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | en | - |
| dc.publisher | Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía | - |
| dc.relation | Documento de trabajo (Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía);110 | - |
| dc.source.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10908/11947 | - |
| dc.title | Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritsm | - |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | - |
| dc.type | info:ar-repo/semantics/documento de trabajo | - |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | Universidad de San Andrés | |
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