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| Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
|---|---|---|
| dc.provenance | Universidad de San Andrés | - |
| dc.creator | Arozamena, Leandro | - |
| dc.creator | Weinschelbaum, Federico | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-04T16:52:59Z | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-14T17:55:23Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-05-04T16:52:59Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-05-14T17:55:23Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-05 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://10.0.0.11:8080/jspui/handle/bnmm/55362 | - |
| dc.description | We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders welfare more than her own private utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal. | - |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | en | - |
| dc.publisher | Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía | - |
| dc.relation | Documento de trabajo (Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía);103 | - |
| dc.source.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10908/11927 | - |
| dc.title | On favoritism in auctions with entry | - |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | - |
| dc.type | info:ar-repo/semantics/documento de trabajo | - |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | Universidad de San Andrés | |
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